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Toxic Choices: The Theory and Impact of Smoking Bans￿
Abstract
Smoking bans in the workplace and public places are now ubiquitous. While indices of such controls are
commonly included in econometric models, there exists little theory that validates or analyzes them. This
paper ￿rst proposes a theoretical model of maximizing behaviour on the part of smokers which serves as
a vehicle to evaluate bans. It is a type of nicotine inventory management model where smoking during
one phase of the day impacts utility in other periods. It also includes an intensity choice as part of the
optimization. Calibrated model simulations suggest that, with the exception of heavy smokers, workplace
bans have relatively minor impacts on smokers throughout most of the distribution due to substitution
possibilities. We estimate quantile regressions using Canadian survey data for 2003 and ￿nd that workplace
bans have a surprisingly small impact on the number of cigarettes smoked. However, restrictions on
smoking in the home are found to be of an order of importance greater, even when instrumented. The
policy conclusion is that the e⁄ectiveness of workplace bans depends heavily upon whether there exist
complementary restrictions on smoking in environments to which individuals may wish to switch their
smoking following a workplace ban.
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The purpose of this paper is to formalize theoretically and evaluate empirically the e⁄ectiveness
of smoking bans or restrictions both in the workplace and the home. A substantive empirical
literature now documents the quantitative impact of workplace smoking bans, and many empirical
papers that estimate the impact of tax/price measures attempt to control for the impact of bans,
broadly de￿ned. Evans, Farrelly and Montgomery (1998) has been particularly in￿ uential because
it controlled for the possible endogeneity of the choice of work place. While there is a concensus
at the present time that workplace bans reduce smoking, there has been very little by way of
theoretical support for such ￿ndings. In particular, why do smokers not substitute heavily in their
smoking to periods of the day where smoking is not restricted?
Furthermore, if smokers do reduce the number of cigarettes they smoke as a result of restrictions
on their behavior, are they likely to smoke in a more intensive manner? Higher intensity means
that smokers take longer, deeper and more frequent pu⁄s. It has long been recognized in the
toxicology literature (e.g. Jarvis et al, 2001a) that the quantity of cotinine in a smoker￿ s saliva or
bloodstream is only loosely correlated with the number of cigarettes smoked or indeed the strength
of cigarettes smoked; ￿ strength￿denoting where in the spectrum between ￿ light￿and ￿ regular￿that
a particular cigarette brand is located. Regular strength cigarettes have the potential to deliver
more nicotine and other pleasure yielding toxins than lighter brands. Evans and Farrelly (1998)
proposed that higher per unit taxes induce smokers to switch from light to regular, and Harris
(1980) recommended a tax based upon nicotine content. More recently, Adda and Cornaglia
(2006) have observed that the amount of cotinine in a smoker￿ s body increases only weakly with
the number of cigarettes smoked; indicating a strong degree of intensity substitution in response
to changes in the number of cigarettes smoked, that might in turn be induced by policy measures
designed to restrain smoking.
The ￿rst objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of choice on the part of a
1smoker who faces three choices: how many cigarettes to smoke, at what intensity to smoke them,
and at what intervals during the day. Having developed a model that involves these tradeo⁄s
we impose time restrictions on smokers that limit when they can smoke. In order to maximize
their utility, smokers must choose a new triple. We solve this problem using numerical methods,
having parameterized the model in such a way that it mimics observed behaviors. In essence this
is a type of rationing problem. But while the theory underlying the rationing of ￿ goods￿is well
developed (Tobin and Houthakker, 1950-51, and Neary and Roberts, 1980), less energy has been
devoted to understanding how the rationing of ￿ bads￿might work, in a world where virtually all
rations are directed to such products. For examples: most drugs require a prescription from a
physician and are sold in limited quantities; bars and betting establishments are limited in their
hours of operation; and many toxic products cannot legally be sold to minors.
The theory and simulations we develop suggest that a workplace ban should have an impercep-
tible impact on low number-of-cigarette smokers, that substitution into adjoining periods should
be strong for medium-number smokers, and that a ban should only really bite for heavy smokers.
To test this prediction we estimate quantile regressions of the log of number of cigarettes smoked
on a range of covariates that includes a variable denoting whether the individual is subject to a
workplace ban or not. The data are individual-level from the Canadian Community Health Survey
of 2003. The theoretical conjecture is con￿rmed, and the data further indicate that restrictions on
smoking in the home are an order of magnitude stronger than workplace bans, even after instru-
menting. Our policy conclusion is that the e⁄ectiveness of smoking bans in the workplace depends
critically upon whether there exist limits on smoking in the environment to which smokers may
substitute.
The paper is developed as follows. Section two describes the public policy and toxicological
backgrounds to the issue at hand. Section three develops a quantity-intensity-timing model of
smoking during a typical working day. It contains parameterizations and a solution algorithm.
Section four assesses the impact of a workplace ban within the context of the theory. Section
2￿ve describes the data used in the estimation section. Section six contains the main econometric




While tax increases were once almost the sole policy instrument aimed at reducing tobacco use,
currently governments and municipalities worldwide are relying progressively on smoking bans in
public places, the workplace, and even the, once considerd sacred, ￿ve Bs: bars, billiard halls,
betting shops, bingo halls and bowling alleys. Some of the earliest municipal ordinances were
enacted in California around 1990 (see Moskowitz et al, 2000). In part bans have been introduced
out of the recognition that the e⁄ectiveness of ever higher taxes is limited, on account of the
incentive they provide for illegal production and trans-border shipment1 , and in part because
bans are seen as an additional and distinct measure in the ￿ght against tobacco use. They have
become part of what is now termed the public health move to ￿ denormalize￿smoking. As a measure
of public policy, smoking bans have two objectives: to induce smokers to smoke fewer cigarettes,
or even quit smoking, in the interests of their own health; and to protect other individuals in the
environs of smokers from the impact of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), also known as second
hand smoke (SHS). This paper focuses primarily upon the ￿rst of these impacts. A growing and
inconsistent literature documents the possible impact of bans on hospital admissions due to acute
myocardial infarction - Meyers et al, 2009, and Lightwood and Glantz, 2009, take one stance, but
this is strongly rejected by Shetty et al, 2009.
While health groups universally support the implementation and extension of strictures on
1 As of 2006, more than one quarter of cigarettes sold in Canada were supplied illegally (Gfk Research Dynamics,
2006, and ConvenienceCentral, 2006), while a ￿gure of 22% is proposed in West et al (2008) for the UK.
3smoking in places shared with others, some research has been less than fully supportive. For
example, Adams and Cotti (2008) propose that bans in bars have been found to encourage patrons
to seek out bars in adjoining jurisdictions where smoking is not banned, with the consequence that
road and vehicle accident rates increase as a result of driving further under the in￿ uence of some
amount of alcohol.
The strength of bans (and the level of taxes) varies widely, depending upon the degree of
anti-tobacco ￿ sentiment￿ in the jurisdiction in question (e.g. deCicca et al 2006). Sentiment
against tobacco control is stronger in states or regions where tobacco is grown. For example,
Kentucky, Virginia and the Carolinas have lower tax rates on cigarettes than Massachusetts,
because tobacco furnishes a livelihood for many in the former states (Tobaccofreekids). While
anti-tobacco sentiment may well translate into more widespread bans on public place use, in the
present paper we are less concerned with the source or motivation for bans than with their impact.
On the theoretical front, public policy interventions against smoking have received support
from several recent developments that have addressed the implications of deviations from the as-
sumptions of the traditional utility-maximizing model: Gruber and Koszegi (2006) and O￿ Donohue
and Rabin (2001) have developed policy measures based on models of time inconsistent behav-
iour or projection bias, while Bernheim and Rangel (2004, 2005) have developed a framework in
which environmental cues are capable of triggering mistakes on the part of the brain￿ s decision
mechanism. The former propose internality-correcting taxes, and the latter a correction to envi-
ronments that may cue decision mistakes resulting in excessive drug consumption. These models
stand in contrast to the rational addiction (RA) model of Becker and Murphy (1988) and Becker,
Grossman and Murphy (1994), where individuals are capable of consuming a toxic substance
￿ rationally￿ . The essential element in the RA models is that the consumer correctley recognizes
the impact of current decisions on future states, and smoking may be rational if the future is
su¢ ciently discounted or if current consumption has just a ￿ small￿impact on the utility of future
consumption. In this context, public policy measures designed to reduce smoking could be in the
4interests of individuals exposed to second hand smoke, but not in the interests of rational smokers.
While the model that is developed in the present paper focuses upon intra-day behavior, it is
conditioned upon an individual￿ s degree of addiction, and past experience. Furthermore, to the
extent that bans or restrictions on smoking can alter the current/￿ ow behavior of an individual,
this in turn impacts the stock of accumulated experience with tobacco and hence impacts future
smoking choices.
2.2 Toxicological Basics
An individual who smokes an average number of cigarettes per day at an average degree of intensity,
ingests about one milligram of nicotine per cigarette (e.g. Perez-Stable et al, 1998). Very few
smokers ingest less than 0.8 milligrams or more than 1.4 milligrams. African Americans tend to
smoke more intensively, though whether this is due to a higher genetic disposition or their tendency
to smoke mentholated cigarettes, which reduce the burning sensation, is still a somewhat open
question (Benowitz et al, 2004). In contrast, Chinese Americans smoke many fewer cigarettes
than occidentals, primarily because nicotine stays in their system for a longer time period and
therefore satis￿es the brain￿ s need for the substance for a longer duration (Benowitz et al 2002).
As a starting point, ￿gure 1 below is instructive. It is taken from Jarvis et al (2001a), and
maps the cotinine level (vertical axis) in the saliva samples of individuals who smoke cigarettes of
varying strength (horizontal axis). Cotinine is a metabolite of nicotine and has a half life of about
20 hours, whereas nicotine has a half-life of one hour. Consequently, whatever nicotine content
may be present in a blood or saliva sample, it is a poor indicator of the amount of nicotine actually
ingested in a 24-hour period. Cotinine content is therefore a standard indicator in studies where
such samples are used.
The strength of cigarettes is traditionally determined by smoking machines (Benowitz et al
2005, Kozlowski et al 1998, US DHHS, 2000): cigarettes are inserted into a machine receptacle;
the machines then pu⁄ on the cigarettes and a measure is taken of the milligrams of nicotine (and
5other toxins) inhaled by the machine for many di⁄erent cigarette brands. Each brand therefore
has a nicotine ￿ standard￿ , and it is this standard that is measured on the horizontal axis.
Apart from the high degree of variability in cotinine levels of individuals who smoke a given
strength of cigarette, a stark feature of ￿gure 1 is the very moderate increase in cotinine registered
as the strength of cigarette increases. A similar ￿gure is to be found in Adda and Cornaglia
(2006), indicating that the amount of cotinine in saliva increases equally moderately in response
to increases in the number of cigarettes smoked .
In sum, individuals seem to compensate strongly in their nicotine intake in response to di⁄erent
strength cigarettes and di⁄erent numbers of cigarettes smoked. The reason that individuals do
not smoke each cigarette to its maximum possible nicotine yield is that, while smoking cigarettes
more intensively results in additional nicotine and other ingredients that give greater pleasure to
the brain￿ s receptors, more intensive smoking also yields more carbon monoxide that can induce
dizziness or mild nausea. These two e⁄ects form a trade-o⁄for the individual smoker, and together
they determine an internal solution for intensity: whereas nicotine provides pleasure for some time
after being inhaled, during the time of smoking inhalation also provides disutility on account of
the carbon monoxide. Consequently, an optimal degree of intensity (conditional on a given number
of cigarettes) is where the marginal disutility from greater intensity during the inhalation phase
equals the marginal utility from the additional nicotine for the period during which it remains in
the body. The time dimension of this trade-o⁄, and the time-impact of nicotine are critical to
understanding the compensatory behaviours that smokers may adopt in response to the imposition
of bans that declare certain extended periods of the day to be o⁄-limits to smoking.
63 A Quantity-Intensity-Timing Model of Nicotine Intake
3.1 A model of individual behavior
To formalize the foregoing, suppose a smoker ingests N units of nicotine2 at time t1. Then, the
amount Ne￿￿(t￿t1) of nicotine resides in the system at any time/instant t thereafter, where ￿ is
the known decay rate - that is, the decay rate yielding a half life of one hour. A smoker gets
positive utility Up from this nicotine and let us suppose that this is of the form Up = N￿ where





If an individual smokes c cigarettes per day, and inhales N units of nicotine from each, starting










where Nti is the amount of nicotine in the system at the start of each interval. The c intervals
are bounded by the c + 1 points or instants t1::tT.
The choice of intensity N is determined both by the amount of pleasure it yields throughout
the day through nicotine, and by the short-term disutility it generates on account of the associated
nausea that, in turn, is determined by the rate of inhalation. For the moment this disutility is
instantaneous; it will have a discrete time dimension in the numerical optimization. Accordingly,
de￿ning the disutility Ud associated with this latter impact by Ud = N￿, the net utility U from
daily smoking is
2 The word ￿ nicotine￿should be interpreted broadly in this context. Cigarettes generate utility as a consequence
of inhaling a variety of substances. Toxicologoists believe that nicotine is the most important of these. Thus we do
not view nicotine gum or a nicotine ￿ patch￿as being identical to cigarettes.
3 This condition implies that the marginal utility of nicotine intensity approaches in￿nity as intensity tends
towards zero. Accordingly, this speci￿cation guarantees that an individual will always choose some positive amount
- higher prices may induce reduced consumption but not quitting. Quitting can be incorporated by assuming that
there exists a ￿xed cost to smoking - perhaps a stigma cost. In a world of indexed tastes, smokers are those
individuals whose preferences are such that they obtain a surplus above this value. Since a workplace ban reduces
utility, those individuals just on the smoking margin may quit if a ban results in less surplus than the ￿xed cost.









In intuitive terms, the above states that if, for example, a smoker were to smoke one cigarette
each hour, the resulting stock of nicotine in the body yields utility throughout the day, but that
there is some disutility in the initial phase of each hour on account of the nauseous impact of the
carbon monoxide associated with inhalation. It is this negative utility potential of high-intensity
smoking that limits the intake of nicotine to a level below its potential maximum per cigarette.
3.2 Optimization and solution algorithm
For a given set of relative prices between cigarettes and other goods, the consumer must choose
the optimal number of cigarettes, the optimal spacing during the day of such cigarettes, and the
optimal intensity with which to smoke them. The solution strategy is sequential: we optimize
on the timing of each cigarette, conditional upon a given number of cigarettes purchased; then
the optimal intensity can be chosen; ￿nally, relative prices determine the quantity of cigarettes
purchased. The timing of the smoking decision is obviously critical in a model incorporating bans
on smoking during particular phases of the day. Bans will impact the quantity purchased, distort
the timing and increase the intensity.
Formally, in terms of equation (2) above, the smoker ￿rst chooses the set ft1;t2::tT￿1g, condi-
tional upon the number of cigarettes smoked. Denoting the vector of time choices by ti, the choice
of timing can be separated from the choice of intensity, since the maximand can be written as:






￿ cN￿ = N￿V ￿ cN￿; (4)
where V is the positive utility that accrues during the day to smoking each cigarette at unit
intensity N = 1. Thus, total positive utility can be written as the product of the level of nicotine
intake raised to the power of ￿, and V: It is clear immediately that the program de￿ned by equation
(4) is separable in the choice of timing and intensity.
8This program can be integrated with respect to t, and then a set of choices for the c time
period boundaries ti may be obtained from the gradient vector @Up=@ti = 0;8i. Integrating yields





Di⁄erentiating this with respect to each ti yields conditions that are di¢ cult to work with. To
see this, suppose an individual smokes 30 cigarettes per day. The choice of when to smoke the
second or third cigarette will have consequences on the utility obtained from every subsequent
cigarette - because nicotine decay is incomplete from interval to interval. Postponing the time of
the next cigarette means that more nicotine is carried to all subsequent time intervals. Conse-
quently, the choice of, say, t2 in￿ uences the utility obtained in all 30 time intervals. Accordingly, to
reduce the dimensionality of the problem to manageable proportions, we adopt a search algorithm
that is based on an approximate set of ￿rst order conditions in making the timing choices.
Since the decay rate for nicotine is moderate, in practice a very good numerical approximation
to the underlying ￿rst order conditions can be obtained by limiting attention to the impact of the
choice of any ti on a small number of intervals. In particular, focussing on the utility obtained in
the intervals on either side of any ti, and two further future periods, means that an approximate


















with respect to ti, using the relations
































The solution algorithm starts by allocating the cigarettes evenly over the whole smoking day,
thus determining a starting set of ti values. We then compute @Z=@ti at each such value of ti,
and adjust the ti that corresponds to the largest gradient. If that gradient is negative its ti value
is reduced, if positive, the value is increased. Each time a value of ti is adjusted the new value of
Up is calculated, a new gradient vector is calculated and some ti is again adjusted. The routine
stops when dUp < 0:001. Since the numerical value of utility typically falls in the range f50;150g,
this criterion means that the value of the objective function is changing by less than one in one
hundred thousand at the ￿nal iteration4 .
The smoking day is speci￿ed to lie between 7:30 am and 10:00 pm. This is broken into 145 units
of 6 minutes each, on the grounds that it takes about 6 minutes to smoke a cigarette (a frequent
pattern is one where the smoker inhales perhaps ten times, with 35 second breaks between pu⁄s
- see Hammond et al, 2006). So the solution algorithm yields integer values for the ti vector in
the range f1::145g.
3.3 Optimizing on intensity
An optimal value of intensity N￿ is obtained from equation (4) above:
4 While a su¢ cient condition for this mechanism to attain a maximum is that the Hessian be negative semi
de￿nite, we cannot demonstrate that it has this property because of the complexity of the associated Hessian. The
function will attain a maximum if it has a unique optimum and positive ￿rst derivatives everywhere in the ti space.
While the order of the problem makes it di¢ cult to establish this in the in the general case, we have explored
exact solutions to the maximand where there are a small number of intervals. In such cases the numerical solutions
obtained from the solution algorithm match the analytical solutions, and the 3D images of the function indicate
that it has a unique maximum.
10@U=@N = ￿N￿￿1V ￿ c￿N￿￿1 = 0






For intensity to be decreasing in the number of cigarettes (and thus match the evidence), the
parameters in the model must satisfy the relation implied by the condition @N
￿
@c < 0: Experimen-
tation suggests that a range of values satisfy this requirement. But the parameter values must also
be able to generate intensity outcomes that fall in the range of 0.8 mg to 1.4 mg of nicotine per
cigarette, in order to conform to observed magnitudes. We ￿nd that pairs in the neighbourhood of
f￿ = 0:3; ￿ = 2:5g satisfy both of these requirements. The intuition on the relative magnitudes
of ￿ and ￿ is straightforward: the smokng of the cigarette lasts for a much shorter period than
the utility-yielding nicotine stays in the body. And to obtain the required intensity tradeo⁄, the
immediate disutility from the high intensity must exceed the immediate positive utility from the
nicotine, since the latter is longer lasting.
3.4 Prices quantities and demand functions
To this point, the optimal timing and intensity rules are conditioned upon a given quantity con-
sumed. The link between a chosen quantity and a given price can be established easily by invoking
a quasi-linear utility structure:
W = U(c) + ￿y; (10)
where y represents other goods. Normalizing the price of y at one and de￿ning p as the price of





11In this quasi-linear framework a change in price requires a new quantity of cigarettes such that
marginal utility divided by price is restored to the initial value ￿. Numerically, the value of utility
is obtainable for any quantity of cigarettes purchased (maximizing simultaneously on timing and
intensity), and a marginal utility schedule drops out of this.5
4 Assessing the Impact of Smoking Bans
4.1 Modelling workplace Bans
Smoking bans come in di⁄erent forms. The most common one, and one which would be anticipated
to have the greatest impact on behaviour, is a ban on smoking in the workplace. Workplace bans
e⁄ectively make smoking more di¢ cult and costly for about one half of the e⁄ective day, and
therefore may be expected to have a substantial impact on behaviour.
Within the context of a utility maximizing agent, subject to a budget constraint, such bans
are best envisaged as increasing the cost of a cigarette smoked during these periods: if individuals
choose to smoke a cigarette during their working day, it must be outside the con￿nes of their o¢ ce
or workshop. This involves a time cost that changes radically the price of a cigarette. During
unrestricted segments of the day a single cigarette may cost in the range of 20 - 40 cents, depending
upon whether it is purchased in Europe or the US; but during the restricted segments of the day
an individual must incur the time costs of smoking. Approximately one sixth of an hour is required
to smoke one cigarette (ten minutes ￿six to smoke and four to commute out doors), and so the
e⁄ective cost to a smoker with a $21 per hour job of one such cigarette approaches $4:00 ￿a
tenfold increase in price during the working day in this instance.
Conceptually the solution to the problem of choosing the optimal number of cigarettes to
purchase, when to smoke them and how intensively to smoke them is not di¢ cult: the optimality
condition is that the marginal utility per dollar must be the same for a cigarette smoked during the
working day as one smoked during the unrestricted segments of the day. And each of these must
5 For numerical purposes, in order to get a continuous and di⁄erentiable marginal utility schedule, we regress
the utility values obtained in the optimization on a low-order polynomial in c.
12equal the marginal utility of consumption on other goods, which, by assumption of quasi-linear
utility, is constant and ascertainable from a base parameterization of the model.
To understand the impact of a workplace ban, consider ￿gure 2 below. The day runs from 7:30
am to 10:00 pm at night, and the working day from 9:00 am to 12:30 and from 13:30 to 17:30.
If the price during the working/restricted day, pr, is ten times the price during the unrestricted







A requirement that marginal utility during the working day increase by a factor of ten will
require a substantial reduction in quantity consumed during that period. As a consequence of such
a quantity reduction, the marginal utility of cigarettes smoked during the unrestricted periods must
rise. The mechanism by which a new equilibrium is attained depends upon the fact that cigarettes
smoked in any phase of the day contribute to the stock of nicotine in the body beyond the smoking
period.
In the ￿rst place, cigarettes smoked in the initial unrestricted period of the day (morning) have
a carry-over utility value: each morning cigarette produces a stock of nicotine that has lasting
utility value through the morning work period. These early morning cigarettes produce a greater
marginal utility in the absence of smoking during the morning work period: the nicotine stock
they produce is not augmented further by work-time cigarettes, and therefore their marginal utility
increases. We term this the knock-on e⁄ect.
Consider now the unrestricted evening period. A reduction in afternoon smoking means that
the stock of nicotine in the body is depleted when the evening period arrives. In turn this implies
that the marginal utility of cigarettes smoked in the early phase of the evening period is high and
therefore it becomes optimal to smoke more cigarettes during this early evening phase than in the
absence of an afternoon smoking ban. This impact we term the nicotine de￿cit impact.
It is clear that the mid-day response to a ban on morning and afternoon work time smoking
13will likewise demand an increase in the number of cigarettes smoked, because both the nicotine
de￿cit e⁄ect and the knock-on e⁄ect are in play.
This then is the intuition underlying the results for the computable model. While the following
section of the paper estimates some quantile regressions, it is instructive to examine how much
smoking substitution is implied by the calibrated model. To get a sense of this we model the opti-
mal response behaviour of a heavier than average smoker - one who smokes 18 cigarettes per day
in a ￿ no restricions￿workplace. The price of a cigarette is assumed to be 40 cents (corresponding
to about 5:50 Euro per pack or eight Canadian dollars ￿somewhat higher than the current US
price).
Optimality requires a smoking strategy that satis￿es eq. (12) above and in addition that
allocates a given daily total of cigarettes across all ￿ve periods such that utility is maximized.
That is, de￿ning the intervals I as I1::I5, and the number of cigarettes smoked in each interval
by i;j;k;l;m, a utility maximum for any total c requires that
U(I1i; I2j; I3k; I4l; I5m) > U(I1i0; I2j0; I3k0; I4l0; I5m0) 8 i0; j0; k0; l0; m0: (13)
where
i + j + k + l + m = c = i0 + j0 + k0 + l0 + m0: (14)
The dimensions of the optimization are reduced by noting ￿rst that the initial cigarette of
the day should be smoked at the ￿rst possible moment. This is because postponing that ciga-
rette would essentially waste a small amount of nicotine at the end of the day. Second, it is
straightforward to show that, with a su¢ cient di⁄erence between the full price of a cigarette in
the unrestricted and restricted intervals, the last cigarette to be smoked in intervals I1 and I3
should be at the latest possible moment in those intervals (a cigarette in the following instant costs
ten times as much but is a close substitute). By the same reasoning, the ￿rst cigarette smoked
14in intervals I3 and I5 should be at the ￿rst possible instant in those intervals on account of the
nicotine-de￿cit e⁄ect.
4.2 Numerical results and behaviours
The results for this particular experiment are contained in table 1. At a price of $0:4 per cigarette
in the unrestricted interval, and $4:0 in the restricted intervals, it is optimal to reduce total
purchases from 18 to 16, to smoke none in the restricted intervals and to distribute the cigarettes
in a fI1 = 6; I2 = 0; I3 = 5; I4 = 0; I5 = 5g pattern, as indicated in column (ii).
There are several notable aspects of this experiment. First is the allocation within the day:
lunch time smoking increases due to a combination of the nicotine-de￿cit e⁄ect and the knock-
on e⁄ect, each described above, operating in the mid-day interval. An optimal plan involves a
quick nicotine catch-up when the lunch interval arrives, and simultaneously a stocking up for the
afternoon period. In contrast, the evening allocation should not be so great as to loose the utility
value of nicotine in the body when the end of the day arrives ￿it is optimal to have a low stock of
nicotine at the end of the day, and therefore to avoid consuming too large a number in the evening
interval.
The second notable aspect of the constrained decision making is that condition (13) is satis￿ed
at a value of c that is surprisingly close to its unconstrained value (16 rather than 18). This
result is due to the stock-￿ ow nature of the model. A reduction in smoking during the restricted
intervals increases the marginal utility of cigarettes in the unrestricted periods.
Third, the optimal value of intensity increases - see the ￿nal row in table 1. This occurs on
account of the increase in the marginal utility that the reduced number of cigarettes entails, in
turn requiring an increase in the disutility of intensity - which occurs at a higher level of intensity.
Consequently the reduction in nicotine ingested is even less than the amount suggested by the
reduction in quantity consumed.
Fourth, the switch from smoking during the working day to the unrestricted intervals sees a
15jump in morning smoking, despite the reduction in the total number of cigarettes smoked. Evening
smoking is a⁄ected little, even though it has a substantially greater duration, for the reason that
the utility value of cigarettes smoked at the end of the day is not as great as at the start of the day.
The model suggests that virtually all of the impact of the workday smoking ban is transferred to
the morning and mid-day periods, and very little to the evening period. This predicted increase
in morning smoking could increase exposure to SHS on the part of other family members. Jarvis
et al (2000, 2001b) report that cotinine concentrations among children in the UK have fallen
over time as a result of lower exposure levels globally; they also report that cotinine levels among
non smoking partners increase with the number of cigarettes smoked by a smoking partner. And
while the cotinine concentrations among non-smokers are typically no more than one percent of
a smoker, Hackshaw et al (1997) report that the di⁄erence in cotinine levels between partners
of non smokers and smokers is su¢ ciently large to be signi￿cant in the sense of inducing higher
morbidity risk.
Fifth, this model suggests that high-income individuals should respond more to a workplace
ban than lower-income individuals because their opportunity cost if time is greater. Gruber and
Koszegi (2004) propose that high-income groups have less elastic responses than low-income groups
to changes in the purchase prices of cigarettes. If they are correct, then the impact of di⁄erent
reduction measures (taxes versus bans) varies by income groups. Our econometric results below
provide strong support for this observation.
For illustrative purposes, the optimal nicotine patterns for a restricted and unrestricted day
are represented in ￿gure 3, and the corresponding utility ￿ ows in ￿gure 4.
Sixth, demographic and peer impacts should be important: if A becomes subject to a workplace
smoking ban and wishes to substitute his smoking towards the home in the morning, the ban may
be more e⁄ective if he has a non-smoking partner. However, if he has a smoking partner B, she
too may wish to smoke more in the morning at home, and A and B may together facilitate this
substitution. We investigate this empirically below by using information on the home demographic
16environment of the smoker.
Finally, we observe in practice that individuals do smoke during the working day - frequently
congregating at the workplace entrance at mid morning or mid afternoon. Such observations are
consistent with the model we have developed and with the simulations reported above. It may
be optimal for low wage smokers to incur the higher price during work hours; or it may be the
case simply that the employer is bearing the cost of the workbreak. It follows that the number of




In this section, we use micro data to test the predictions of the theoretical model. In particular,
we examine (i) the simultaneous impact of workplace and home bans in the same regression, with
a view to shedding light on their relative impacts in reducing smoking; (ii) if a workplace ban has
stronger impacts on heavy smokers than on light and medium smokers; and (iii) whether high-
income individuals respond more to a workplace ban than lower-income individuals on account of
their opportunity cost of time.
The smoking outcome that we focus on is the log of the number of cigarettes smoked per day
per smoker (CigQ). Our regressions are of the form:
log(CigQ) = ￿Workban + ￿Homeban + X￿ + Provincefixedeffects + error (15)
Workban is a dummy for workplace smoking ban (1 if there is a ban, including complete and
partial bans, and 0 if there is none); Homeban is a dummy for restrictions on smoking at home (1
if there is some restriction, 0 otherwise); X is vector of socio-economic variables including gender,
age, education level, income, marital status, household size and language of the respondents. We
include province ￿xed e⁄ects to capture province-speci￿c di⁄erences including cigarette taxes and
17prices. Therefore, identi￿cation of workplace ban and home ban e⁄ects is achieved by within-
province variation in these two variables. All our regressions use sample weights and adjust
standard errors for clustering at the province level.
Equation (15) is estimated using three methods. We begin with OLS estimation which pro-
vides us with preliminary estimates. Then we apply quantile methods, to better understand how
di⁄erent segments of the distribution of smokers respond to bans. Next, given a home ban is likely
to be endogenous,6 we instrument it using dummies indicating whether there are children under
5 years of age in the household, and whether the individual belongs to a volunatary organization.
5.2 Data
The data used in our analysis are from the 2003 Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS).7
The cross sectional CCHS surveys are conducted biennially, covering several health aspects of
the population. In particular, there is rich coverage of smoker behaviors, including the number of
cigarettes smoked per day as well as restrictions on smoking at the workplace and in the home.8
It also has detailed information on income, education, and other demographic variables.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the data. Because we study the e⁄ects of smoking bans
on smoking quantity, our sample consists of daily smokers and thus excludes those categorized
as occasional smokers. The average number of cigarettes smoked per day is 16.1.9 57% of
workplaces impose smoking bans; the home ban rate is lower, at 37%. Almost half of our sample
is male, and 13.7% of respondents￿families have one or more children aged ￿ve years or younger.
6 Evans et al (1999) propose that a workplace ban may be endogenous due to workers￿ self selecting into
workplaces on the basis of whether or not there may exist a smoking restriction. We think this is possible but is
unlikely to be of large magnitude in the modern era given how extensive are such bans. Furthermore, our data
do not yield a good instrument for the workplace ban. Most importantly, our focus on the endogeneity of home
restrictions is driven by our ￿nding that the e⁄ects of the latter are much stronger than those of workplace bans.
7 CCHS 2003 cycle is chosen for two reasons. First, the question on home smoking restrictions is posed only to
non-smokers in previous CCHSs. Second, questions on home and workplace ban are asked only in a sub-sample of
the 2005 CCHS survey, which therefore su⁄ers from sample size problems.
8 The question asked on workplace ban is: ￿At your place of work, what are the restrictions on smoking?￿
Possible responses include: (i) Restricted completely, (ii) Allowed in designated areas, (iii) Restricted only in
certain places, (iv) Not restricted at all. For the home ban, the question is: ￿Are there any restrictions against
smoking cigarettes in your home?￿and the answers are binary: (i) yes, (ii) no.
9 CCHS surveys accept 99 cigarettes per day as maximum. This number is too large to be credible and population
representative. We therefore exclude those who report smoking more than 60 cigarettes a day from our sample.
18The average age of the smokers in our sample is 42.10 and 46% of the sample reports living
with a partner. Income is categorized into 5 levels, with 34% of respondents earning less than
$15,000 a year and approximately 15% obtaining more than $50,000. Nearly half of the sample




The results from OLS estimation are presented in Table 3. Column 1 results contain a workplace
ban dummy but not a home ban control. The workplace ban coe¢ cient is negative and statistically
signi￿cant, indicating that it reduces smoking by about 9% on average - less than two cigarettes
perday11 . In column 2, we keep the socio-economic controls but replace the workplace control by a
home ban dummy. The resulting home ban coe¢ cient is also negative and statistically signi￿cant.
Its e⁄ect is almost three times larger than that of a workplace ban, suggesting that it might reduce
the numebr of cigarettes smoked on average by four per day.
Because the e⁄ect of a workplace ban might be included in the home ban estimated e⁄ect, in
column 3 we include both home ban and work ban dummies in the following column of results. The
e⁄ect of the workplace ban decreases slightly but is still statistically signi￿cant. The home ban
coe¢ cient also drops slightly, but remains three times are large as the workplace ban coe¢ cient.
This suggests that home bans play a considerably more important role than workplace bans in
reducing smoking. Combined, the overall e⁄ect is to reduce daily consumption by 30% - about
￿ve cigarettes. This is a large number and we examine the potential endogeneity of the home ban
below by instrumenting it.
The remaining variables have the expected e⁄ects. Male smokers light up more frequently than
10 Age is coded into 15 categories in the dataset.
11 The dummy variable coe¢ cients are interpretable as percentage di⁄erences in the number of cigarettes smoked
relative to the ￿ omitted category￿individual in the regression. This individual smokes just very slightly less than
the median individual, so we can reasonably interpret the coe¢ cients on the ban variables as percentage impacts
relative to a typical median individual.
19their female counterparts. Age and income e⁄ects both follow a mildly inverted U pattern. Smokers
in middle income groups smoke most heavily. Note that this does not imply that individuals with
higher income smoke more, given that the participation rate is much lower among those with
higher incomes. Higher education is monotonically correlated with lower number of cigarettes
smoked per day. Meanwhile, those who speak English smoke more heavily than those speaking
other languages. The dummy Student, included to control for those currently at school, has a
large negative coe¢ cient, indicating that students smoke less than those who are not. Its large
magnitude compared with the coe¢ cient on college degree group probably indicates a cohort e⁄ect.
That is, those who already have a college degree used to smoke a lot more as students than those
who are currently students.
5.3.2 E⁄ects by Income Groups
We now test whether the impact of a workplace ban varies with income. If our behavioral model
of smoking is correct, it implies that the real cost of smoking a cigarette is larger for those with
higher incomes: the largest part of the total cost of a cigarette in a regime with a workplace
ban is the time cost. Hence higher income individuals have a greater incentive to reduce their
smoking than those on lower incomes. The results are presented in Table 4. While a work ban has
no perceptible impact on the lowest income groups, it becomes more e⁄ective for higher income
groups, and has the largest e⁄ect at the top of the income distribution. There thus appears to
be a threshold, somewhere below the middle of the income distribution, where a workplace ban
becomes more e⁄ective on account of time costs. This evidence supports the theoretical model
developed in the earlier part of this paper. 12 The home ban e⁄ects are again large, though
somewhat more uniform across income groups than the workplace bans. We also estimate the
model for di⁄erent educational groups. The results are presented in Table 5. Given the high
positive correlation between income and education, it is not surprising that we ￿nd e⁄ects similar
12 Besides the interpretation of higher opportunity costs of time for higher income groups, peer e⁄ects may
generate this outcome: if higher income smokers hold more important positions in an organization they may be
more subject to social pressure to avoid taking smoking breaks at the entrance to their workplace.
20to those when the sample is disaggregated by income group. Speci￿cally, a workplace ban has no
impact on the lowest educational group but becomes more e⁄ective for higher educational groups.
5.3.3 Heavy Smokers and Lighter Smokers: Quantile Regressions
We now test the second prediction of our theoretical model - that workplace bans have larger
impacts on heavy smokers, by estimating a quantile regression which includes both workplace and
home ban controls. The results for selected quantiles are presented in Table 6. The e⁄ects of a
workplace ban are quite small throughout, though broadly increasing in going from the low to
the high quantiles. The 2.8% reduction at the twentieth quantile amounts to essentially no real
impact, despite a signi￿cant coe¢ cient. Given that the number of cigarettes smoked per day in
this range is in the region of six to seven, the coe¢ cient amounts to stating that the average impact
is to take a couple of pu⁄s less per day. At the mid and upper mid ranges the impact becomes
more meaningful and averages about 6% - implying a numerical reduction of a little more than
one cigarette. In contrast, at the ninety ￿fth percentile a 9% impact implies a reduction in excess
of three cigarettes perday. In sum, the overall e⁄ects are again surprisingly small, with meaningful
reductions achieved only at the very upper end of the distribution. Furthermore, the results are
remarkably consistent with the output of the theoretical model in the preceding section. A smoker
smoking 18 cigarettes per day - the value used in our illustrative simulation - lies between the
sixtieth and seventieth percentiles, and the simulation indicated that such a smoker would reduce
intake by two per day. We were initially surprised that the reduction was so modest, yet there
appears strong support for it in the data.
In contrast to a workplace ban, a home ban is considerably more important throughout the
whole range of the distribution. The e⁄ects in the bottom 60% of the distribution are such as
to reduce smoking by one quarter. The percentage reductions decline as we move to the higher
percentiles, but the absolute impact increases: a 25% reduction at the lower level may result in a
reduction of just two cigarettes, whereas a 12% reduction at the top end reduces the number by
21as much as ￿ve cigarettes per day. Figure 5 describes the impact of each ban at every percentile
in the distribution.
To this point it appears that if a smoker is subject to both a work place and a home ban, he
will reduce his intake substantially. However, workplace bans, despite the commonly held view,
are of less value, and have very little impact outside the top of the distribution. To see if this
￿nding is robust to endogeneity concerns we now present the results for an IV estimation.
5.3.4 IV estimation
The presence or absence of home restrictions could arise from several unobservable sources: ￿rst,
it may result from negotiations between family members (where the smoker is not classi￿ed as
an ￿ individual￿ ), including the smoker. Unfortunately our data base has no information on the
smoking behaviour of a partner or spouse. A second channel may arise through home restrictions
being a type of committment device used by an individual as a result of poor health or advice
from a physician.
Our main instrument for dealing with the endogeneity of the home ban is a dummy indicating
whether households have one or more children less than twelve years old. We believe this is a
strong instrument: worrying about the e⁄ect of exposure to smoke by o⁄spring, parents are more
likely to put in place restrictions against smoking at home. This instrument is also likely to be
valid, because we expect the only way young children a⁄ect their parents￿smoking is through
pressuring them not to smoke at home, which is captured by the home ban.
Another instrument we use is whether a respondent is a member in a voluntary organization.
Being a member of voluntary organization, one would be more likely to adopt a home smoking ban
if there are smoking restrictions in the voluntary organizations themselves, and if other members
already have smoking restrictions at their homes. Additionally, such membership may denote that
an individual is more concerned about the externalities that attend his (smoking) behavior.
The results of the IV regression are shown in Table 7. The ￿rst two columns of the table use one
22of the two instruments, the third column results are based on both instruments being included. The
coe¢ cients on home ban from these two just-identi￿ed 2SLS regressions are negative, statistically
signi￿cant and a bit larger than the OLS estimates. This is not at all surprising, because in the
context of heterogenous treatment e⁄ects, the IV estimate here is LATE (local average treatment
e⁄ect), and estimates the impact of a home ban on the complier group (i.e. those who impose
home ban if having children under 12 years old and those who do not if having no children under
12). This complier group is most likely to respond to the home ban. In contrast, OLS estimates
the mean e⁄ect on the whole population.
The F statistics for excluded instrument from ￿rst stage regressions are 227 and 29 which
exceed the conventional critical value of 10 used to assess weakness of instruments. Thus, they
are not weak instruments.
We next include both instruments in our regressions. The home ban coe¢ cients do not deviate
much from the just-identi￿ed cases. More importantly, there is little di⁄erence between the results
estimated by 2SLS and LIML. This is reassuring because it is well known that 2SLS is likely to be
biased, especially in the presence of weak instruments, and that LIML provides better estimates
than 2SLS in ￿nite samples. Also, the tests indicate that the nulls of weak instruments are easily
rejected and the nulls of valid instruments cannot be rejected.
6 Conclusion
It is important to recognize that this paper is about behavior and incentives. It is not about
social well being, nor is it about the appropriate role for governments in controlling tobacco use.
This given, the results are are remarkably clearcut. If we take seriously the idea that smokers
should substitute from periods when smoking is prohibited to periods when it is not, then the
imposition of bans on smoking in the workplace should be small for most smokers. Our theoretical
model has additional predictions: (i) heavy smokers should be the ones most heavily impacted by
a workplace ban, (iii) higher income smokers experience a higher time cost when a workplace ban
23is imposed and therefore should exhibit greater reductions, and (iii) smokers have an incentive to
smoke their reduced number of cigarettes more intensively.
Our empirical work indicates that the groups most a⁄ected by bans (in an absolute sense) are
those at the top of the smoker distribution and at the top of the income distribution, the former
because substitution becomes more challenging, and the latter on account of their elevated time
costs.
A new ￿nding in this research is that the impact of restrictions on smoking in the home is an
order of magnitude larger than the impact of workplace bans. The growing spread of restrictions
on smoking in the home means that workplace bans are more e⁄ective now than in an era when
such home restrictions were rare: ultimately the e⁄ectiveness of government-imposed work bans
depends upon the inability of smokers to switch their smoking to the home or extra-workplace
environment. Consequently, the direct impact of government decrees on workplace bans as stand-
alone policies would appear to be modest.
These results are consistent with, yet distinct from, those of Evans, Farrelly and Montgomery
(1998). They found that the impact of a workplace ban was to reduce smoking by 10% among
smokers, whereas we ￿nd a reduction in the neighbourhood of 6% for a median smoker. Our data
are for a much more recent period (2003) than the data used by Evans et al (1992 and 1993).
The number of cigarettes smoked per day has declined dramatically among continuing smokers in
that time interval, on account of higher real prices in both jurisdictions (the US and Canada) and
evolving social norms. The larger declines they obtain may be a function of the greater di¢ culty
in avoiding bans, given the greater number of cigarettes smoked per day in 1992 and 1993 by a
typical smoker.
Finally, how can the health consequences of all of this be assessed? The answer hinges critically
upon whether health costs are convex or concave in toxin intake. The severity of the health
impact of smoking increases with the amount of smoking: smoking for a greater number of years
or smoking more cigarettes per day increases the lifetime probability of tobacco-related morbidity.
24For example, Godfredsen et al (2005) ￿nd that quitters reduce their probability of disease realtive
to continuing smokers, and also that moderate smokers have lower risks than heavy smokers.
Speci￿cally, they ￿nd a near exact proportionate relationship in the relative disease probability
between smokers who smoke fewer cigarettes and smokers who smoke more. However, if low-
quantity smokers smoke more intensively than higher-quantity smokers, their ￿nding implies that
health consequences are convex in the amount of nicotine-correlated toxins in the body. Our
quantile regression results indicate that the biggest impact of workplace bans is at the upper tail
of the distribution of smokers. As a consequence, a reduction in toxin intake of a given amount in
this range of the distribution may lead to a greater improvement in health than an equal reduction
at reduced smoking rates. Thus, even if workplace bans do not reduce toxin intake substantially
when smokers consume a realtively small number of cigarettes per day, health improvements may
still materialize as a result of heavy smokers smoking less, given the observed convexities.
As a last word of caution, it must be recognized that more work needs to done in assessing
econometrically the intensity response of smokers to these two types of bans. It it critically
important to understand if the impact of home and workplace restrictions may may moderated
by such responses.
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29Table 1 Optimal smoking patterns with and without smoking bans (7:30am - 10:00 pm)
(i) C = 18, Unrestricted (ii) C = 16, Restricted (iii)C = 16, Unrestricted
Interval 1 (morning pre work) 1 1 1





Interval 2 (morning work) 18 21
t = 16 .. 50 26 30
35 40
43 49
Interval 3 (lunch) 51 51 58




There are 145 six-minute intervals in this smoking day.
30Table 1 Optimal smoking patterns with and without smoking bans (7:30am - 10:00 pm) (continued)
(i) C = 18, Unrestricted (ii) C = 16, Restricted (iii)C = 16, Unrestricted
Interval 4 (afternoon work) 68 68
t = 61 .. 100 77 77
85 87
94 96
Interval 5 (evening) 102 101 106




Optimal intensity 1.054 1.081 1.094
There are 145 six-minute intervals in this smoking day.
31Table 2. Summary statistics, CCHS 2004
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Numcigs 25109 16.109 8.68165 1 60
ln(Numcigs) 25109 2.61245 0.62735 0 4.09435
Work Ban 22567 0.57269 0.4947 0 1
Home Ban 25023 0.37074 0.48301 0 1
Child under 5 25109 0.13601 0.3428 0 1
Male 25109 0.49512 0.49999 0 1
Age 25109 7.2337 3.27906 1 15
Spouse 25031 0.46574 0.49884 0 1
Hhsize 25109 2.3666 1.22195 1 5
English 25109 0.65761 0.47452 0 1
Less than $15,000 21716 0.34458 0.47524 0 1
$15,000 - $30,000 21716 0.27068 0.44432 0 1
$30,000 - $50,000 21716 0.22638 0.4185 0 1
$50,000 - $80,000 21716 0.12277 0.32818 0 1
More than $80,000 21716 0.0356 0.18528 0 1
Less than secondary 24592 0.3306 0.47044 0 1
Secondary school 24592 0.21259 0.40915 0 1
Some post-secondary 24592 0.07974 0.2709 0 1
Post-secondary 24592 0.37707 0.48466 0 1
32Table 3 Workplace ban and home ban e⁄ect, OLS estimation





Male 0.122*** 0.136*** 0.127***
-0.0119 -0.0104 -0.0106
Student -0.234*** -0.207*** -0.218***
-0.0424 -0.0393 -0.0439
Age 20-24 0.0884*** 0.0855*** 0.0821**
-0.0245 -0.025 -0.026
Age 25-44 0.241*** 0.224*** 0.220***
-0.0334 -0.0372 -0.0371
Age 45-64 0.326*** 0.299*** 0.294***
-0.0483 -0.0513 -0.0509
Age 65+ 0.175*** 0.0997** 0.145***
-0.0314 -0.0344 -0.038
Spouse -0.00149 0.0254* 0.0181
-0.013 -0.0122 -0.0126
Hhsize -0.0250* -0.00838 -0.00452
-0.012 -0.0115 -0.0109
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
33Table 3 Workplace ban and home ban e⁄ect, OLS estimation (continued)
Variables Workban only Homeban only Workban & Homeban
Income_2 0.0260** 0.00327 0.0224**
-0.00827 -0.00856 -0.00903
Income_3 0.0641* 0.0339 0.0658**
-0.0294 -0.0235 -0.0286
Income_4 0.0799*** 0.0589** 0.0902***
-0.0157 -0.0206 -0.0176
Income_5 0.143*** 0.111** 0.149***
-0.0373 -0.047 -0.0443
Educ_2 -0.0499*** -0.0427*** -0.0357***
-0.0105 -0.012 -0.0102
Educ_3 -0.0882** -0.0892** -0.0777**
-0.0358 -0.0359 -0.0333
Educ_4 -0.117*** -0.0960*** -0.0937***
-0.00768 -0.00724 -0.00851
English 0.0790* 0.0818** 0.0799*
-0.0407 -0.0354 -0.0392
Constant 2.383*** 2.420*** 2.432***
-0.0611 -0.0585 -0.0634
Observations 19824 21295 19816
R-squared 0.082 0.108 0.112
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
34Table 4 Workplace ban e⁄ect, by income groups
Variables Lowest income Low income Average income High income Highest income
Work Ban -0.005 -0.095*** -0.140*** -0.107 -0.215***
-0.011 -0.025 -0.032 -0.076 -0.049
Home Ban -0.189*** -0.208*** -0.284*** -0.258*** -0.301***
-0.012 -0.034 -0.023 -0.038 -0.039
Male 0.070** 0.101*** 0.152*** 0.251*** 0.186***
-0.025 -0.026 -0.013 -0.04 -0.046
Student -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.297** -0.483*** -0.854**
-0.049 -0.041 -0.127 -0.066 -0.347
Age 20-24 0.076*** 0.05 -0.037 0.045 0.136
-0.019 -0.04 -0.108 -0.108 -0.169
Age 25-44 0.244*** 0.158** 0.13 0.145 -0.062
-0.033 -0.063 -0.107 -0.106 -0.114
Age 45-64 0.340*** 0.259*** 0.184 0.200* 0.014
-0.07 -0.077 -0.105 -0.102 -0.094
Age 65+ 0.234*** 0.048 -0.093 0.261* 0
-0.065 -0.048 -0.128 -0.125 0
35Table 4 Workplace ban e⁄ect, by income groups (continued)
Variables Lowest income Low income Average income High income Highest income
Spouse 0.015 0.019 0.026 -0.041 0.028
-0.019 -0.029 -0.016 -0.036 -0.053
Hhsize -0.007 -0.014 0.002 0.015 -0.001
-0.025 -0.013 -0.008 -0.021 -0.03
Educ_2 -0.039 -0.078* -0.016 0.014 -0.090**
-0.027 -0.041 -0.044 -0.105 -0.04
Educ_3 -0.065 -0.129*** -0.079 -0.011 -0.082
-0.053 -0.035 -0.091 -0.068 -0.067
Educ_4 -0.084*** -0.130*** -0.083 -0.028 -0.115
-0.013 -0.025 -0.053 -0.096 -0.066
Langu2 0.071 0.143** 0.025 0.039 0.093*
-0.055 -0.064 -0.044 -0.039 -0.048
Constant 2.375*** 2.548*** 2.666*** 2.594*** 2.551***
(￿0:088) (￿0:081) (￿0:13) (￿0:087) (￿0:22)
Observations 6472 5352 4690 2564 738
R-squared 0.128 0.097 0.105 0.107 0.171
36Table 5 Workplace ban e⁄ect, by education groups
Variables < Secondary Secondary Some post secondary College and university
Workban -0.0485 -0.0828*** -0.078 -0.104***
-0.0347 -0.0131 -0.0519 -0.00935
Homeban -0.242*** -0.197*** -0.238*** -0.246***
-0.0258 -0.0298 -0.0555 -0.0274
Male 0.103*** 0.119*** 0.120** 0.142***
-0.0159 -0.0298 -0.0477 -0.0077
Income_2 0.0574*** 0.0121 0.00228 0.0122
-0.0171 -0.0283 -0.0298 -0.0224
Income_3 0.067 0.0899** 0.055 0.0531**
-0.0788 -0.0302 -0.0568 -0.0169
Income_4 0.0637 0.0959** 0.0992** 0.0843***
-0.0911 -0.0332 -0.0445 -0.0207
Income_5 0.244*** 0.155** 0.216*** 0.112*
-0.0646 -0.0609 -0.066 -0.0595
English 0.143** 0.0972** 0.0393 0.0379
-0.0514 -0.0423 -0.0851 -0.0504
37Table 5 Workplace ban e⁄ect, by education groups (continued)
Variables < Secondary Secondary Some post secondary College and university
Age 20-24 0.0916** 0.131*** 0.0341 0.121
-0.0311 -0.0309 -0.0635 -0.0954
Age 25-44 0.216** 0.292*** 0.201*** 0.232*
-0.0814 -0.0578 -0.0512 -0.127
Age 45-64 0.194* 0.358*** 0.299*** 0.344**
-0.0899 -0.0634 -0.0493 -0.153
Age 65+ 0.0193 0.299*** 0.195 0.216
-0.0643 -0.0602 -0.136 -0.143
Spouse 0.0584* 0.017 0.00434 -0.00962
-0.0277 -0.0175 -0.0452 -0.0193
Hhsize -0.0360** -0.0116 -0.00865 0.0176
-0.0158 -0.0129 -0.0206 -0.0127
Student -0.194** -0.135* -0.241*** -0.248***
-0.0782 -0.0612 -0.0619 -0.055
Constant 2.438*** 2.342*** 2.569*** 2.335***
-0.057 -0.074 -0.116 -0.153
Observations 5843 4351 1673 7949
R-squared 0.126 0.098 0.19 0.098
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
38Table 6. Smoking ban e⁄ects at di⁄erent quantiles
Variables q20 q40 q60 q75 q85 q95
Workban -0.028*** -0.057*** -0.065*** -0.061*** -0.044*** -0.094***
-0.001 -0.009 -0.022 -0.019 -0.013 -0.01
Homeban -0.269*** -0.252*** -0.249*** -0.170*** -0.104*** -0.124***
-0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -0.013
Male 0.191*** 0.223*** 0.184*** 0.121*** 0.087*** 0.160***
-0.003 -0.012 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.004
Income_2 0.045*** 0.034** 0.015 0 0.002 -0.019***
-0.006 -0.013 -0.02 -0.009 -0.005 -0.004
Income_3 0.076*** 0.058*** 0.037 0.008 0.004 -0.01
-0.018 -0.013 -0.025 -0.018 -0.012 -0.009
Income_4 0.109*** 0.095*** 0.073*** 0.030* 0.015*** -0.002
-0.009 -0.007 -0.024 -0.016 -0.003 -0.019
Income_5 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.099*** 0.045** 0.037*** 0.085***
-0.033 -0.033 -0.035 -0.021 -0.005 -0.017
Educ_2 -0.033*** -0.041** -0.030*** -0.030** -0.030*** -0.041***
-0.009 -0.019 -0.008 -0.012 -0.002 -0.009
Educ_3 -0.042** -0.073*** -0.070** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.044
-0.02 -0.011 -0.027 -0.011 -0.001 -0.057
Educ_4 -0.096*** -0.109*** -0.085*** -0.068*** -0.051*** -0.062
-0.01 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.041
Student -0.240*** -0.185*** -0.159*** -0.186*** -0.175*** -0.105***
-0.052 -0.049 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.032
39Table 6. Smoking ban e⁄ects at di⁄erent quantiles (continued)
Variables q20 q40 q60 q75 q85 q95
Age 20-24 0.130*** 0.117*** 0.125 0.114 0.083 0.051
-0.004 -0.035 -0.08 -0.073 -0.052 -0.042
Age 25-44 0.335*** 0.305*** 0.328*** 0.341*** 0.198*** 0.128***
-0.056 -0.003 -0.03 -0.031 -0.008 -0.034
Age 45-64 0.394*** 0.427*** 0.458*** 0.401*** 0.254*** 0.231***
-0.038 0 -0.038 -0.032 -0.002 -0.006
Age 65+ 0.192*** 0.202*** 0.279*** 0.280*** 0.179*** 0.119***
-0.031 -0.058 -0.06 -0.046 -0.007 -0.023
Spouse 0.026*** 0.011 -0.013*** -0.008** -0.015** -0.026
-0.001 -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.019
Hhsize 0.002 0.006*** 0.011*** 0 0.007** -0.005
-0.004 0 -0.002 0 -0.003 -0.006
English 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.011***
-0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 0
Constant 1.867*** 2.246*** 2.509*** 2.742*** 2.996*** 3.355***
-0.035 -0.002 -0.027 -0.021 -0.016 -0.012
Obs 19816 19816 19816 19816 19816 19816
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
40Table 7. IV Estimation of Home Ban E⁄ects
Variables IV=Children IV=Member IV=Children IV=Children IV=Children
&Member &Member &Member
2SLS GMM LIML
Homeban -0.391*** -0.292* -0.366*** -0.356*** -0.366***
-0.082 -0.172 -0.077 -0.084 -0.077
Workban -0.074*** -0.079*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.076***
-0.014 -0.022 -0.016 -0.018 -0.016
Male 0.130*** 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130***
-0.009 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
Age 20-24 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.075** 0.075** 0.075**
-0.027 -0.028 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Age 25-44 0.207*** 0.208*** 0.201*** 0.202*** 0.201***
-0.039 -0.028 -0.038 -0.036 -0.038
Age 45-64 0.270*** 0.279*** 0.269*** 0.271*** 0.269***
-0.051 -0.034 -0.046 -0.043 -0.046
Age 65+ 0.124*** 0.128*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.119***
-0.043 -0.021 -0.035 -0.033 -0.035
Educ_2 -0.026** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.026***
-0.012 -0.01 -0.01 -0.009 -0.01
Educ_3 -0.070** -0.075** -0.072** -0.072** -0.072**
-0.031 -0.036 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031
Educ_4 -0.078*** -0.091*** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.084***
-0.013 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
41Table 7. IV Estimation of Home Ban E⁄ects (continued)
Variables IV=Children IV=Member IV=Children IV=Children IV=Children
&Member &Member &Member
2SLS GMM LIML
Income_2 0.020** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
-0.01 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
Income_3 0.066** 0.066** 0.067** 0.066*** 0.067**
-0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026
Income_4 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.100***
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Income_5 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.158*** 0.156*** 0.158***
-0.048 -0.038 -0.043 -0.041 -0.043
Student -0.207*** -0.221*** -0.216*** -0.216*** -0.216***
-0.044 -0.056 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Constant 2.468*** 2.458*** 2.474*** 2.470*** 2.474***
-0.063 -0.03 -0.052 -0.044 -0.052
Observations 19816 19594 19594 19594 19594
R-squared 0.098 0.11 0.101 0.103 0.101
First stage F F(1,10) =227 F(1,10) =29 F(2,10) =185 F(2,10) =185.58 F(2,10) =185.58
Overidentify Score = 0.49 Hansen￿ s J = .18 A-R = .47
Restriction test (p = 0.48) (p = 0.67) (p = 0.48)
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses; *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regression controls for spouse, household size and English language.
42Figure 1. Cotinine levels as a function of cigarette strength (Jarvis et al,
2001)
am and pm work periods: ban on smoking
Morning                         Lunch Evening
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Figure 4. Utility path for optimal consumption pattern of 16 cigarettes
44Figure 5. Workplace and home bans by quantile of smokers.
45